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No HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE GUILTY?: Barksdale v. Blackburn -A
TIME FOR REAPPRAISAL
In October, 1963, Bruce Barksdale, with hammer in hand, robbed
and raped a young woman in her apartment. He was indicted by a
twelve member grand jury, two of whom were black, on the charge
of aggravated rape. The trial produced overwhelming evidence
against him, including three positive identifications and a signed
confession. Although Barksdale pleaded not guilty,' he offered no
defense, questioned no evidence, and ultimately was convicted by an
all white jury. For eighteen years, Barksdale, a black man, turned to
every available channel of review, alleging discrimination in the
selection of both the grand jury and the petit jury venire.' The Loui-
siana Supreme Court, on appeal, unanimously found no discrimina-
tion.' The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.' Both the
state supreme court" and the federal district court' denied his peti-
tions for habeas corpus. Then, in 1980, a panel of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting,' agreed with
Barksdale's contentions and reversed the district court.8 The Court
of Appeals, however, sitting en banc, reversed the panel and held9
1. "Barksdale pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The insan-
ity defense was never pursued at trial, however, and was withdrawn after closing
arguments." 639 F.2d 1115, 1118 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Barksdale alleged that all but a token number of Negroes were systematically
excluded from the grand jury which indicted him and from the petit jury venire from
which the jurors who tried him were selected. 639 F.2d at 1117 n.1.
3. State v. Barksdale, 247 La. 198. 170 So. 2d 374 (1964).
4. State v. Barksdale, 382 U.S. 921 (1965).
5. State ex reL Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So. 2d 318 (1968). Barksdale
later applied for habeas corpus relief on other grounds. This petition also was denied.
State ex reL Barksdale v. Henderson, 257 La. 551, 242 So. 2d 886 (1971).
6. Barksdale's petition originally was heard by a magistrate. Upon his recommen-
dation, the district court set aside the conviction. The state's appeal was dismissed.
Barksdale v. Henderson, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974). The state then moved to
vacate the judgment based on an improper holding of a hearing by a magistrate under
Wingo v. Wedding. 418 U.S. 461 (1974). The motion was granted and affirmed on ap-
peal. Barksdale v. Henderson. 510 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045
(1975). The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing and after three such hear-
ings, the district court finally denied the petition. See 639 F.2d at 1119.
7. Judge Ainsworth dissented, 610 F.2d at 272. and subsequently wrote the en
banc opinion, 639 F.2d at 1116.
8. United States ex reL Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1980).
9. The precise basis for the court's holding is not .clear: "Since we find that
Barksdale has not proven a prima facie case of jury discrimination, the state's rebuttal
evidence may seem to be superfluous. But we hold, as an alternative grounds for our
decision, that even assuming, arguendo, that Barksdale did meet his initial burden, the
state adequately rebutted his case." 639 F.2d at 1128.
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that Barksdale had failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion with respect to both the grand jury and the petit. jury venire.
United States ex rel Barksdale v. Blackburn, 639 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.
1981).
One of the issues which apparently merited en banc considera-
tion0 was whether the defendant's guilt or innocence should be a
preliminary consideration within habeas corpus review. Although
ultimately dicta," the court questioned whether the recent Supreme
Court decision in. Rose v. Mitchell'" made all claims of state grand
jury discrimination cognizable on federal habeas corpus and
whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
such grand jury dicrimination might be harmless error.'3
The term "habeas corpus," which literally, means "have the
body,"" refers to a variety of writs whose.purpose is to bring a party
before a court or judge.'5 When used alone, the two words commonly
refer to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, whose primary
function is to release a person from unlawful-imprisonment." Article
I, section 9 of the United States Constitution explicitly recognizes
the writ," and the Judiciary Act of 1789 included it in the first grant
of federal court jurisdiction." But, because neither the Constitution
10. For a case to receive en banc consideration, the court must find a suggestion
of "a' precedent setting error of exceptional public importance." 5th CiR. R. 16:1.
11. "[Wle need not rest on the inappropriateness of habeas corpus since we find
that Barksdale's claims do not prevail on the merits." 639 F.2d at 1121.
12. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
13. 639 F.2d at 1120.
14. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 634 (unabridged
ed. 1966).
15. Among these, writs are the writs of habeas corpus ad proiequendum (used to
remove a prisoner in order to prosecute in the proper jurisdiction wherein the fact
was committed), and the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum (used to bring up a
prisoner detained in a jail or prison to give evidence before the court). See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 638-39 (5th ed. 1979).
16. See Stone v. Powell, 4.28 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1975) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
17. "The privilege of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
18. That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to
issue writs of scire facia, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided
for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise* of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of
the justices of the supreme court, 'as well as judges of the district courts, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the
cause of committment. -Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case ex-
tend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of
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nor the Judiciary Act defines the term "habeas corpus," great disa-
greement has developed over the exact scope of the writ." The first
guidance as to the appropriate function of the writ was given by the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Bollman." In that opinion, Chief Justice
Marshall maintained that to understand "the meaning of the term
habeas corpus, resort [should] unquestionably be had to the common
law."" The common law referred to by Justice Marshall was the
heritage of English law brought to the continent by the colonists
and often expressed in the colonial charters and statutes and later,
in the state constitutions. Since all but one of the colonies modeled
their habeas corpus statutes after the English Habeas Corpus Act of
1679," the accepted function of the writ of habeas corpus at the time
of the framing of the Constitution probably was the same function
the writ served in England at that time.
By the latter part of the eighteenth century, England's writ of
habeas corpus had been molded by a long history of religious con-
flicts, jurisdictional disputes, and political battles between Parlia-
ment and the Crown." In its earliest form,2' the writ constituted a
step in the mesne process" whereby the sheriff was ordered to "pro-
duce the body" of an unwilling party before the court to answer a
complaint against that party." In the fourteenth century the writ of
the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of
the same, or as necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
19. See generally the authorities cited in notes 20, 22 & 23, infra.
20. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). See also Ex parte Watkins, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 157 (1883); McFeeley, The Historical Development of Habeas
Corpus, 30 S.W. L.J. 585 (1976).
21. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95.
22. See Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the United States, 1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
243, 253 (1965).
23. For an excellent review of the English legal history concerning the writ of
habeas corpus, see Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978). See also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF.ENGLISH LAW 108 (rev. 7th ed. 1956); 1 J. REEVES, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 147 (5th ed. W. Finlanson ed. London 1869); McFeeley, supra note 20.
24. The writ was established in about the thirteenth century. See Duker, supra
note 23, at 993.
25. "As distinguished from final process, this signifies any writ of process issued
between the commencement of the action and the suing out of execution." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1085.
26. See generally Duker, supra note 23, at 995.
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habeas corpus and the writ of certiorari were combined in use: A
prisoner would petition for a writ of certiorari to examine the cause
of his imprisonment, and the court would issue a writ of habeas to
bring the petitioner before it. This combined use of the two writs
became so common that a separate and distinct form of writ evolved,
one which a prisoner petitioned for directly: habeas corpus cum
causa.2
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the writ of habeas
corpus, which could be issued by all organs of government, became a
useful tool in a great struggle for power among the various institu-
tions of England's government. 8 Since the English governmental
system was not based upon the separation of powers doctrine, the
jurisdiction and power of what Americans would consider various
27. Id.
28. The biggest struggle during this period was between the various central
courts, especially the Chancery (equity) Courts and the courts of common law. The
judges of the Chancery Courts were governed only by the dictates of their conscience
in administering justice. 1 J. REEVES, supra note 8. They were, therefore, very open to
influence by the King who held their appointments in his hand. The notorious Star
Chamber, one of the Courts of Chancery, was especially abusive in the eyes of the
English people. The King, through this Court, often imprisoned persons who began to
rival him in importance. The abuses by the Star Chamber led to its legislative abolish-
ment in the original Habeas Corpus Act of 1641. 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10, § 3 cited in
Duker, supra note 23, at 1036.
In 1605, the King's Bench was held to be thesuperior court, and therefore no writ
of habeas corpus could remove a person committed by it. Anon., 72 Eng. Rep. 883 (K.B.
1605). However, this holding did not give the King's Bench the power to remove some-
one committed by another court with jurisdiction. Duker, supra note 23, at 1017-18.
The courts of common law also felt that the High Commission or ecclesiastical
courts had no authority to fine or imprison and so held in Sir Anthony Roper8s Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 1326 (K.B. 1608). The writ often was used to free persons imprisoned by
this court for purely "spiritual" matters. See Lady Throgmorton's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1347 (K.B. 1611) (broke up daughter's marriage); Sir William Chancey's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1360 (K.B. 1612) (adultery).
29. There were basically four organs of law: the central courts, the local courts,
the House of Lords, and the Privy Council. The central'court system was made up of
the Court of Chancery, which handled matters in Equity; the King's Bench, which
handled criminal cases; the Court of Exchequer, which handled cases involving royal
revenues; the Court of Common Pleas, which handled civil matters; the High Commis-
sion, which handled ecclesiastical matters; the Court of Requests, which handled claims
for small debts. All judges were appointed by the King and could be removed at his
will. They sat in the Great Hall of Westminster in London. See BLACK's LAW Dic-
NOTES
"branches" of government" often overlapped." By issuing a writ,
one "branch" or institution would bring a prisoner before it to deter-
mine if the court, council, or lord who had imprisoned the person
had the jurisdiction and therefore the power to hear such a case.
The institution issuing the writ would only question the cause of
commitment, however, and if the cause as given in the return was a
proper cause to be handled by the imprisoning agent, no relief
would be granted.2
During the seventeenth century, the writ came to be seen as a
"protector of liberty.."I 3 Before the transition at the end of the
seventeenth century from the monarchical system of government to
the parliamentary system,8' the King often exercised arbitrary
powersN and the writ was used to gain release for persons imprison-
rlIONARY. supra note 15, at 321-26. The local court system met at the county level and
was composed of justices of the peace, appointed by the King, who met four times a
year at the largest city in the county to hear cases of people who could not go to
Westminster. The House of Lords, comprised of clergymen and abbotts, was the
ultimate word in the legal system. A number of lords were appointed royal officials by
the King. The highest royal official was the Lord Chancellor and was usually a peer of
the realm. He also served as the Chief Justice of the Court of Chancery. The Privy
Council, a predecessor of the modern day administrative agency, was the organ
through which the King carried on the work of the government. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 23, at 477-78.
30. See Duker, supra note 23, at 1025.
31. Id. at 1018.
32. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1042-43 (1970). As late as 1758, the judges of the various central courts agreed
.that the truth of the return was not examinable because it was a question of fact for a
jury to be ascertained in other proceedings. The court said it was not concerned with
the truth of the return but with the sufficiency in point of law to justify detention. 9
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 119-20.
33. Duker, supra note 23, at 1030. See also Darnell's Case, 3 Cobbett's St., Tr. 1
(1627).
34. Duker, supra note 23, at 1031.
35. See note 28, 8upra; the Grand Remonstrance, which was a stinging indictment
of the King for past malfeasance, C. MIRTH, THE HOUSE OF THE LORDS DURING THE CIVIL
'WAR 98-99 (1910); the Habeas Corpus Act of 1641, supra note 28, abolishing the Star
Chamber while providing the writ to examine the cause of imprisonment by any court
claiming the same jurisdiction as the Star Chamber, the Privy Council, or the King.
The people were especially unhappy with the royal tax system. See, e.g., Darnell's
Case, 3 Cobbett's St., Tr. 1 (1627) (imprisonment for refusal to pay King Charles forced
loan). The aggravated state of finances forced the King one year after Darnel's Case
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ed as a result of such powers. Because the imprisonment was often
without a hearing, on the basis of invalid laws or royal orders, the
writ of habeas corpus earned the title "protector of liberty."
Protection of liberty, or protection from illegal detention as it is
sometimes called, meant something quite different in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries from what it means today. Detention was
illegal only if it was without recourse within the judicial process ' -
not because a particular constitutional right of the person had been
infringed,"7 or 'because of an impropriety or error in the proceed-
ings." Although habeas corpus was the only means a prisoner had to
seek review of his imprisonment, the writ was not available to
everyone. In fact, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679"9 specifically ex-
empted from the use of'the writ persons committed for "felony or
treason" and persons "convict[ed or in execution by legal process."10
to assemble a Parliament. Many of those elected to this Parliament had suffered im-
prisonment for failure to pay the unconstitutional appropriation. J. TANNER, ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE 17th CENTURY 61 (1928).
36. See McFeeley, supra note 20, at 590. See also Bushnell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep.
1006, 1007 (C.P. 1670). Arguably, the writ of habeas corpus was a procedural tool used
basically to insure a speedy trial by jury. See 31 Cr. 2. c. 2, § 7, as summarized in 9 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23. at 118 ("Prisoners indicted for treason or felony must be
tried at the next session or bailed; ... if not tried they must be discharged."). There is
some evidence that this idea was carried over in American. For example, Charles
Pinckney, at the convention to ratify the Constitution in South Carolina said, "The
next Article provides for the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus-the Trial by
Jury in all cases .... " 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 149 (M.
Farrand ed. 1937).
37. See McFeeley, supra note 20, at 590.
38. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Act of 1816, 56 Geo. III, c. 100; Ex parte Thomas, 13
J.P. Jo 762 (1849) ("if . . . a party is rightly in custody, we do not interfere."); In re
Andrews, 4 C.B. 226 (1847) (a court cannot entertain questions as to irregularities of
process); In re Cobbett, 7 Q.B. 187 (1845) ("where detention is objected to solely on the
ground of an alleged impropriety in the details of the suit . . this court will not in-
terfere); In re Baines, 41 E.R. 401, L.C. (1840) ("The object of our control ... is ... not
to correct any error. . .. ). The above citations appear in 16 THE ENGLISH EMPIRE
DIGEST 284, 285, 290 (1981 reissue).
39. 1679 31 Car. 2. c. 2. The Act was passed to rectify a number of problems:
prisoners being sent overseas beyond the reach of the writ, see ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE DURING THE USURPATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, 5 STATE TRIALS at 941; 9 H.C.
JOUR. 142 (1669); what to do when the Court was out of term or in vacation, see, e.g.,
Proceedings against Francis Jenkes, (1678), 6 STATE TRIALS at 1190; insulation from
the writ by the concept of privilege, see, e.g., Proceedings against Anthony Earl of
Shaftsbury, (1677), 6 STATE TRIALS at 1269-1306, as cited in Duker, supra note 23, at
note 440, 492, 505.
40. 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 2 (1679). See, e.g., Ex parte Lees, 120 Eng. Rep. 718, 721 (Q.B.
I NOTES
The law as clarified by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and later,
by the Bill of Rights of 1688,"I-was not altered for more than a cen-
tury."" Thus, when the United States Constitution was framed"3 and
the Judiciary Act enacted, the common law writ 6f habeas corpus
was an extraordinary remedy available to relieve only very limited
types of illegal custody - non-judicial custody, detention under order
of a court which was without jurisdiction in the matter (including
lack of jurisdiction because the cause set out in the writ was not
considered a crime)," or pretrial detention without bail or speedy
trial. This function of the writ, as embodied in the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679 and adopted by most of the colonies,'" served as the
model for Chief Justice Marshall in his interpretation of the Con-
stitution and the Judiciary Act."
In 1789, Congress passed the first Judiciary Act'" empowering
the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus only to federal
prisoners; the courts were prohibited from issuing writs to state
prisoners.'" Two years later, Congress passed the Bill of Rights'
1860). See generally McFeeley. supra note 20. See also 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
23, at 118; Developments, supra note 32, at 1044-45; Note, Relieving the Habeas Cor-
pus Burden: A Jurisdictional Remedy, 63 IowA L. REV. 392, 394 (1977).
41. The Bill of Rights corrected the abusive bail courts had been applying to
evade the Act. I William & Mary Sess. 2, c. 2, § 1(10).
42. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 119. See also Ex parte Lees, supra note
40, and other cases at note 38, supra.
43. Those delegates who met in Philadelphia were fully aware of the common law
and the colonial experience with habeas corpus. Colonial governors and councils had at-
tempted to enforce obedience by detaining persons without judicial proceedings, and
numerous instances have been reported where the writ was used against imprison-
ment by these governors and proprietors. See generally R. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE
RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE
CONNECTED WITH IT 101 (1876); W. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS COR-
Pus 2 (2d ed. 1893); McFeeley, supra note 20, at 594.
44. Today an unconstitutional statute would be comparable to insufficient cause.
45. See note 22, supra, and accompanying text.
46. See note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
47. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
48. "Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in
gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the
United States .... For the full text see the Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 18.
Also, one commentator suggests that the clause was placed in the Constitution to pro-
hibit Congress from suspending state habeas relief for federal prisoners. See Duker,
Rose v. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powelk The Role of Federal Courts and Federal
Habeas, 23 How. L.J. 279 (1980).
49. The first ten amendments to the Constitution were submitted together to
Congress in 1789; ratification was completed on December 15, 1791. See HART &
WECHSLER, infra note 133.
1982] 1129
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
which was also applicable only to the federal government."0 Not until
1867,11 following the Civil War and just prior to the passage of the
fourteenth amendment, did Congress enact legislation to broaden
the scope of the ,writ to bring state petitions within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.52
Even after the 1867 Act the federal courts continued to follow
the traditional jurisdictional test and refused to hear petitions if the
state court had had proper jurisdiction to hear the cause.63 During
the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century,
however, the Supreme Court began expanding the concept of "juris-
diction," thereby increasing the availability of the writ.5" The Court
50. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
51. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
52. Most legal scholars realize that the 1867 Act was designed to aid the
Reconstruction policy. Duker, supra note 48, at 289. In fact, the revocation of an 1868
measure removing the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus mat-
ters, was seen as a signal that Reconstruction was over and that federal interference
with the state criminal processes was again unwelcome. Id.
53. See, e.g., Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); In re Woods, 140 U.S. 278(1890); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830);
Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38 (1822).
54. "During the nineteenth century, the expansion was so gradual that the Court
may not" have been aware of the far-reaching results of its actions. Comment, Guilt.
Innocence, and Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1123, 1124 n.12
(1980).
The decline of the jurisdictional requirement accelerated with Frank v. Mangum,
237 U.S. 309 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Frank held that a
federal court could not grant habeas corpus relief where to do so would disturb an ade-
quate state determination; the state had provided Frank such a determination.
However, the justices stated that though a state trial court may have jurisdiction
originally, mob domination could cause it to lose that jurisdiction in the course of the
proceedings. Habeas corpus could therefore be used to inquire into the whole of the
proceedings to see if the treatment afforded the defendant fell below what due proceils
.required. Of course, at that time the concept of due process in state criminal justice
was construed very narrowly. See Comment, supra, at 1124 n.13. In Moore, although
the Court focused on the adequacy of the process available in the state (as had Frank)
* and found it had not been provided, the Court was also concerned with the substance
of the petitioner's claim. In Moore, the Court dealt with a situation it could reason
satisfied the Siebold/Frank jurisdictional test: "When the proceedings, though formally
proper, were really so defective that the trial was a sham, the trial becomes absolutely
void." and habeas corpus is a suitable remedial measure. 261 U.S. at 92. Commentators
dispute the consistency of Moore and Frank. Compare Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoner, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-89 (1963),
with Rietz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1315, 1329 (1962). After Moore, the Court loosened the jurisdictional require-
ment even further. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (the trial court
lacked jurisdiction when the defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of the
assistance of counsel).
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reasoned that "compliance with . .. [a] constitutional mindate ...
[was] an essential jurisdictional prerequisite" and that a "court's jur-
isdiction at the beginning of [a] trial [could] be lost 'in the course of
the proceedings'" if the court committed a constitutional error. Of
course, during this same period there was a two-tiered level of
analysis used in determining whether a court had committed con-
stitutional error: The full Bill of Rights applied in federal pro-
ceedings, while only a restricted interpretation of due process
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment applied in state
proceedings. This bifurcated approach often led to cases where
grave constitutional errors by today's standards, if committed by a
state court, would not be cognizable on federal habeas corpus
review." As the Court began to expand the concept of due process
to include guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, however,
more and more state courts were deemed to have lost jurisdiction
based on constitutional error. The inevitable expansion of the scope
of the writ forced the Court to reconsider its jurisdictional require-
ment and, in Waley v. Johnston,"7 the Court abandoned the require-
ment and simultaneously extended habeas corpus to cases where the
jurisdiction was valid but where "the conviction ... [had] been in
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ ...[was] the only effective means of preserving his rights."8
After Waley, a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief had only
to meet two procedural requirements: He had to prove that he had
not been afforded an adequate state corrective process, and he must
have exhausted all state remedies. In 1953, the Court in the compan-
ion cases of Brown v. Allen 8 and Daniels v. Allen"0 rejected the ade-
quate state corrective process requirement 1 while retaining the ex-
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467, 468.
56. In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906) (denying federal prisoners relief although their
convictions allegedly violated the fifth amendment). See also In re Wood, 140 U.S. 270
(1891) (denying a state prisoner relief based on a claim of discriminatory selection of
grand and petit jurors); Ex parte Bigelow. 113 U.S. 328 (1885) (denying a double jeopardy
claim).
Another development which could have been relevant to the Court's broadening in-
terpretation of cognizable claims took place in 1916. In that year, Congress passed a
jurisdictional statute. which for the first time gave the Supreme Court discretion (on
certiorari) to refuse to review on the merits many cases where a state criminal defen-
dant's federal contentions had been rejected by the state courts. Act of Sept. 6, 1916,
ch. 448, § 237, 39 Stat. 726.
57. 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced guilty plea, facts dehors the record).
58. Id. at 105.
59. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
60. Id. These cases were reported together.
61. See text at notes 63-65, infra.
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haustion requirement. 2 In Brown, although concluding that a federal
district court could decline to award a writ of habeas corpus without
a rehearing of the facts," the Court stated that "a trial ... [could] be
had in the discretion of the federal court or judge,"" even when the
issue had been fully and fairly litigated at the state leyel.15 In a later
opinion" the Court said that Brown symbolized a "manifest federal
policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not
be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial
review." 7
The continued expansion in the scope of the writ paralleled the
Warren Court's expansion of the concept of due process. Habeas cor-
pus seemingly was becoming the procedural tool used by the Court
to enforce its constitutionalization of criminal procedure." Fay v.
Noia,9 in 1963, marked the high point in the expansion of the writ.
In that opinion, the Court concluded that a failure to make a timely
appeal within the state corrective process should not bar federal
habeas review." The effect of this decision was to remove the last
62. "A failure to use a state's available remedy, in the absence of some interfer-
ence or incapacity ... bars federal habeas corpus." 344 U.S. at 487. "Failure [to appeal]
... bars subsequent objection to conviction . id. at 486.
63. Id. at 465.
64. Id. at 463-64.
65. See Bator, 8upra note 54, at 493-99; Note, supra note 40, at 400.
66. Faye V. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Friendly interpreted the Brown reasoning as
follows: The Court felt that with the growth of the country and increased court
business, "it could no longer perform its historic function of correcting constitutional
error in criminal cases by review of judgments of state courts and had to summon the
inferior federal judges to its aid." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 155 (1970).
67. 372 U.S. at 424. The year before Brown, the Conference of Chief Justices had
adopted a resolution expressing a consensus that "a final judgment of a State's highest
court [should] be subject to review or reversal only by the Supreme Court of the
United States." CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES-1952, 25 STATE GOVERNMENT 249-50, as
cited in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 451 n.5. Although'citing this resolution as evidence
of the sensitivity in the aiea, the majority in Brown gave the Chief Justices a negative
response. Two years after the decision, the Chief Justices, in a joint effort with a com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, tried again. Habeas Corpus:
Hearing on H.R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 34, 89-95 (1955). The more detailed bill passed the
House but died in the Senate. See Note, supra note 40, at 403.
68. Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1041-42 (1977). See also Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS 235 (1967). A broadened concept of standing also
helped the Court to enforce the rules set out in its opinions. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
69. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
70. See Note, supra note 40, at 399. Fay also announced a "deliberate by-pass
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time limitation in petitioning for federal review, thereby greatly in-
creasing the number of petitions the federal courts would receive.
This dramatically increased caseload left what Justice Frankfurter
called an "untidy area"' in its wake."2
During the last ten years, the Burger Court has not made any
major expansions in the federal court's habeas corpus jurisdiction.""
In fact, the decision in Stone v. Powell" in 1976 actually withdrew
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction from those cases in which
evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures was in-
troduced at trial." Possibly more significant, though, was the indica-
tion in Stone that for the first time a majority" of the Court may
test," 372 U.S. at 438, under which an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege" by a petitioner who directly participated in the decision must
be made. Id at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
The Fay Court also asserted that at the time of the Suspension Clause and the first
Judiciary Act "there was respectable common-law authority for the proposition that
habeas was available to remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fun-
damental law." 372 U.S. at 405. It has now been shown that this assertion is simply
wrong. The historians cited in the opinion disagree with such a conclusion. See Bator,
supra note 54, at 465-83; Oaks. Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
MICH. L. REv. 451, 466 (1966).
71. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter. J., dissenting).
72. In 1952. there were 541 state habeas corpus petitions to federal district
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 536 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring). By 1970, the sec-
ond year of the Burger court, there were 9,063. AMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (Washington, D.C. Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Court, 1979) at 61.
73. Also, in Congress, in the last fifteen years, a number of attempts to change
the habeas corpus statute have been made. Some commentators say these attempts
failed, largely due to a feeling that any withdrawal of jurisdiction would be held un-
constitutional. See, e.g., Note, supra note 40, at 405. For example, S. 917. 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., 114 CONG. Rc. 11186, 11189 (1968) contained a provision that would have in
effect barred any Article III court from having jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state
criminal conviction except on writ of certiorarito the Supreme Court. The provison en-
countered. overwhelming opposition from both legal and legislative communities, op-
position which largely centered on the constitutionality of the section under the sus-
pension clause; it was stricken from the bill before it became law. 114 CONG. REC. at
13850-67. Senator Scott, during the debates, said, "it had about as much chance of be-
ing held constitutional as the celebrated celluloid dog chasing the asbestos cat through
hell." Id. at 14183.
74. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
75. Id. at 495.
76. Other justices in the past have advocated such a view. See, e.g., Justice
'Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (concurring opinion); Justice
Black in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 233 (1968) (dissenting opinion);
Justice Jackson in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298-99, 302 (1949) (dissenting
opinion); and Justice Clark in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 296 (concurring opinion).
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have accepted the view that federal habeas relief should not be
available to prisoners who allege only errors that do not cast doubt
on their guilt." However, the holding was more narrow,"8 and in
answer to Justice Brennan's concern that Stone would lay the
groundwork for. a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdic-
tion,""9 the majority inserted a footnote emphasizing that the deci-
sion did not concern the scope of the habeas corpus statute.0 Justice
Brennan's concern may have been well-grounded, though, for by re-
moving from the jurisdiction of the federal courts a claim which had
been reviewed for the past twenty years, 1 the majority expressed a
willingness to reconsider the scope of habeas review. 2 And,
although indicating a belief that the authority of the federal courts
to issue the writ came from a statutory, not constitutional, basis,3
the Court never addressed the statute upon which its jurisdiction is
based.8 ' The Stone Court also expressed a confidence in the state
judicial system which seemingly was lacking in the past;85 Sto-ne,
coupled with the recent decision in Sumner v. Mata,8 perhaps in-
dicates a trend in the Court to give more weight to state court
determinations.
Three years later, the Supreme Court reviewed a grand jury
discrimination claim in Rose v. Mitchell.8" Although holding that
77. 428 U.S. at 490. "Resort to habeas corpus . .. for purposes other than to
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in
serious intrusions on values important to our system of government." Id. at 491 n.31.
See also Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powelk A Remedy Only for the
Arguably Innocent? 11 U. RiCH. L. REv. 291, 293 (1977).
78. "[Wihere the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an un-
constitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." 428 U.S. at 482.
79. Id. at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. "Our decision today is not concerned' with the scope of the. habeas corpus
statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally. ... Id. at 495 n.37
(emphasis in original).
81. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 5,15,
564 (1980).
82. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 60, 202 (1979).
83. 428 U.S. at 474-75. See also Boyte, supra note 77, at 307.
84. 1978 Term, supra note 82, at 202.
85. "[W]e are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of ap-
propriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the
several States .... [Tlhere is no intrinsic reason why . .. a federal judge [is] more com-
petent ... than his neighbor in the state courthouse.'" 428 U.S. at 494 n.35.
86. 101 S.Ct. 764 (1981). See text at notes 153-160, infra.
87. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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"federal habeas corpus relief remains available to provide a federal
forum for ... [grand jury discrimination] claims,""8 the Court, by the
very fact that it considered whether such a claim should be cogniz-
able, implicitly accepted Stone's premise that "exceptions to full
review might exist with respect to particular categories of constitu-
tional claims."'" In Part II of the Rose opinion, the Court addressed
two initial arguments: (1) whether claims of grand jury discrimina-
tion should be considered harmless error, on direct review or in a
habeas corpus proceeding, when a defendant has been found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) whether such claims should be
cognizable at all on federal habeas corpus in light of Stone v.
Powell.,
In Section A of Part II, the Court addressed the issue of harm-
less error. It determined that a defendant's right to a reversal of his
conviction-a right recognized consistently since the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment"- springs from the rights of society as a
whole to receive equal protection under the law." The Court con-
sidered this right to be of fundamental importance; 3 to violate it
would be to cast doubt on judicial integrity and to impair the con-
fidence of the public in the administration of justice.' Admitting
that costs accompany any reversal of a conviction"-although not
recognizing what these costs are nor the weight to be afforded
them-the Court reasoned that reversal was less drastic in grand
jury discrimination cases than in other cases where a constitutional
88. Id at 564. There was no clear majority on any one part of the opinion.
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall joined; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in Parts I,
II and IV. Justice White and Justice Stevens joined in Parts I and II. Justice Rehn-
quist filed a statement concurring in part. Justice Stewart and Justice Powell filed
opinions concurring in the judgment in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White
filed an opinion dissenting to Parts III and IV, in which Justice Stevens joined. Justice
Stevens filed an opinion dissenting in part.
89. 428 U.S. at 478-79. See 1978 Term, supra note 82, at 202.
90. However, the Court's analysis of the availability of habeas was unnecessary to
its decision, since the respondents failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 443 U.S. at 547. "The opinion, therefore, was merely a signal from the Court that
habeas corpus would continue to be used to articulate constitutional values." Duker,
supra note 48, at 285.
91. 443 U.S. at 551.
92. Id. at 556.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 557.
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violation occurs, because when a jury discrimination case is retried,
no evidence is suppressed."' It also concluded that other available
remedies were ineffectual. 7 Justice Blackmun therefore left open
reversal of a conviction as the main route to vindicate the right to
equal protection in the selection of a grand jury."
In Section B of Part II, the Court addressed the second issue -
whether Stone v. Powell barred review of grand jury discrimination
claims -and distinguished Rose from Stone by noting six ways such
claims differed from exclusionary rule claims." However, because
the chief concern in Section B was a state court's incapacity to judge
itself,1 this discussion does not diminish the implication in Stone
that federal habeas relief would be provided only for the arguably
innocent,10' unless the State has failed to provide "an opportunity for
full and fair litigation" 02 of a claim. Rose basically held that a state
court was incapable of providing a fair forum for the litigation of a
grand jury discrimination claim. Because the Court discussed so
many issues related to grand jury discrimination,' the reasoning
behind the Court's holding is unclear. Rose could be read to suggest
any of four different forms of analysis: (1) full review for claims based
on "personal constitutional rights" rather than on "judicially created
remedies;"104 (2) full review for claims the Court deems particularly
compelling;"' (3) full review only after having balanced the costs and
benefits of each claim;' or (4) full review only for those claims ques-
tioning the fairness of the state's own corrective procedures when
96. I& at 577-58.
97. IM at 558.
98. d. at 559.
99. (1) Grand jury claims are based on a constitutional violation by the judiciary,
whereas exclusionary rule claims are based on violations by the police; (2) the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause has applied to the states since its adop-
tion, whereas the fourth amendment and the "judicially created" exclusionary rule has
only recently been applied; (3) the educative effect of a habeas hearing on the police is
of minimal value, whereas state officials operating the judiciary system should be ex-
pected to take note of the federal court's, determination; (4) there is a greater concern
for judicial integrity in jury discrimination claims that exclusionary rule claims; (5) the
costs in retrial are less in grand jury claims than exclusionary rule claims because no
evidence is suppressed; and (6) the constitutional interest is more compelling in a
grand jury discrimination claim. See generally i& at 560-64.
101. See note 77, supra, and accompanying text.
102. 428 U.S. at 482.
103. See note 99, supra.
104. 443 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted).
105. Id at 564.
106. Id. at 562-63.
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the nature of the claim suggests judicial impropriety."'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, given an opportunity in
Barksdale to review a case similar to Rose,' questioned the
precedential value' of Part II of the Rose opinion, noting that this
section was joined by only two of the justices who joined in the
judgment of the Court."' Even conceding the possibility that Part II
of Rose could be part of the holding, the Fifth Circuit raised the
question of whether the language in Rose should be dispositive of
every case and concluded that "in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances of a particular case, such grand jury discrimination
might still be harmless error."'" Judge Ainsworth, writing for the
majority, considered that in the instant case two members of the
grand jury were black, that Louisiana was in the process of eradi-
cating jury discrimination, that there were three positive identifica-
tions, numerous items of persuasive physical evidence, and a signed
confession-all unquestioned-and that Barksdale had never made a,
serious claim of innocence, and concluded that "[ilf ever there was a'.
case in which harmless error should apply it is this one."
'  
.
The majority, consisting of twelve of the twenty-two judges sit-
ting en banc, also agreed with Justice Powell's contention, as stated
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,"' that the "'central reason' for
habeas corpus is 'the affording of means, through an extraordinary
writ, of redressing unjust incarceration'"' and questioned whether
"freeing a petitioner who is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a
heinous crime furthers that central concern."" ' Although troubled
by the use of habeas corpus to free guilty prisoners, the Fifth Cir-
cuit avoided deciding the issue and based its decision on the merits
of the case."' One can only speculate, however, as to how much the
107. Id. at 561.
108. Although Rose concerned a grand jury discrimination claim, there were some
specificities which differed from Barksdale: Rose concerned only discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury foreman; Barksdale also involved alleged discrimination in the
petit jury; and Rose did not come to the Supreme Court from a southern state.
109. The dissent, joined by ten of the twenty-two judges, considered Part II to be
precedent because, in toto, five justices agreed with it. For a discussion of Rose as
precedent, see 1978 Term, supra note 82, at 199-209.
110. See 639 F.2d 1115, 1120 (1981).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
114. 639 F.2d at 1120.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1121.
1982] 1137
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
uncontradicted evidence of Barksdale's guilt weighed on the minds
of the judges as they considered the merits of the petitioner's claim
and found no jury discrimination where in similar cases discrimina-
tion had been found."7
As can be seen, the reaches and purposes of habeas jurisdiction
are presently unclear. Recognizing that its power is statutorily
determined by Congress,"8 the Court-in the absence of Congres-
sional direction-seems to be attempting to mold the structure of
the writ through judicial statutory interpretation to fit the needs
and concerns of the legal system today. Three particularly troubling
concerns within our legal system are: (1) political concern of federal/
state government relations, (2) the judicial concern of efficiency in
the judicial process and (3) the societal concern of releasing guilty
defendants. Interrelated as they are, a resolution of one naturally af-
fects each of the others; and, the federal court, limited to a "case
and controversy" determination, are rarely given the grounds to
consider all three concerns simultaneously. Often, by' forming a
possible solution to one problem, the Court is not able to take into
account the effect such solution may have on the other concerns.
Each of these interests is equally important and fundamental to a
proper functioning of our governmental system; a proper appraisal
of one-namely, release of guilty defendants through habeas corpus
review-cannot be done without consideration of the other two.
Federalism, or the relationship between the state and federal
governments, has been a concern in our nation since its inception.""
117. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475(1954) and Whius v. Georgia. 385
U.S. 545 (1967), in which disparities between total eligible population and eligible black
males and the grand jury venire were similar. See also the dissent in Barksdale which
points out numerous ways in which the majority's reasoning was "illogical" or imper-
missible. 639 F.2d at 1134-36.
118. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 499, 500, 506 (Frankfurter, J.).
119. The Constitution does not explicitly recognize the power of the federal
government to review state court decisions. However, article VI declares the Constitu-
tion to be the supreme law of the land, state constitutions and laws notwithstanding.
Article III establishes the judicial power in the Supreme Court, extends that power to
include all cases arising under the Constitution, and grants appellate jurisdiction in
these cases to the Supreme Court. At least one of the framers, Alexander Hamilton, in
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, interpreted this appellate jurisdiction to encompass appeals
from state court determination of constitutional issues. The first Judiciary Act con-
firmed that interpretation. The Act provided for Supreme Court review of final
judgments or decrees "in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a deci-
sion in the suit could be had ... where is drawn in question the construction of any
clause of the constitution .. " Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73. Twenty-
seven- years later, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the
Supreme Court also confirmed this interpretation.
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Over the years legal scholars have questioned the federal courts'
power of judicial review. In light of the expansive interpretation of
the Bill of Rights in the past twenty years and the subsequent in-
volvement by the federal judiciary in areas historically left to the
states,'"0 there seems to be a growing sentiment in our country-
represented on the Surpeme Court by Justices Rehnquist 2' and
Powell' 2 -to restore some weight to state court determinations and
to restrict some of the federal courts' jurisdiction. Proponents of
this position point out that: (1) state courts were given concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts; 8 (2) state judges are equally
bound with federal judges to uphold the Constitution;'' (3) federal
judges are no more competent than their "neighbor[s] in the state
courthouse";'" and, in fact, state court judges may be more compe-
tent in particular cases because they are closer to the facts; "
and (4) criminal law was meant to be the business of the states.'7
Although state courts have been afforded concurrent jurisdic-
tion,"B a nation of fifty independent entities joined under one
supreme law needs to have one source of interpretation when a con-
flict arises. As Alexander Hamilton said in The Federalist Papers,
"[Fifty) independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same
causes, arising-upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from
which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.""'
Recognizing that the state judges are more easily influenced by
local spirit than federal judges, 3" that their jobs are often at the
120. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. at 487: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971).
121. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at
579, 585 (joining Justice Powell's concurrence); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 407
11978) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 585 (concurring opinion); Castenada v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 507 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at
493-94 n.35.
123. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (i816); THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 82 (A. Hamilton).
124. See Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892).
125. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35. See also Bator, supra note 54, at
509-10.
126. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 410 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Bator, supra note 54, at 509-10.
127. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring); Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 510 (Frankfurter, J.).
128. See note 123, supra.
129. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
130. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
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pleasure of the public,' and that states may not always be inclined
to enforce laws which the government feels promote the best inter-
ests of the nation,"' the framers of the Constitution provided for
Supreme Court appellate review."' These same concerns apply
equally today, but, due to "institutional constraints,""', it has become
impossible for the Supreme Court to "adequately oversee whether
state courts have properly applied federal law."'89 Since the 1950's,'"
the Court has increasingly relied upon the federal district courts,
through habeas review, to act as a surrogate for direct review."'
Concurrent with this grant of added responsibility, the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of review afforded these district
courts. Herein lies the true problem: this expanded form of habeas
review allows a lower federal court ' to overturn determinations of
both law and fact' by the highest court of the state, thus creating a
great deal of friction between the two governments. However, even
though many may feel that the Supreme Court has exceeded its
bounds by an overly broad interpretation of the Constitution and
that federal district courts have no place reviewing state supreme
court decisions, restriction of habeas review only to those claims in
which the petitioner can make a "colorable claim of innocence ' " 
may be unwise and, perhaps unconstitutional."' In effect, removal of
these claims from federal district court review could remove a peti-
tioner's only access to a federal forum.
Using the writ of habeas corpus to review all constitutional
claims affecting a criminal defendant's adjudication has also had a
131. l
132. ld. No. 80.
133. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 24 (2d ed. 1973)[hereinafter cited as HART
AND WECHSLERI.
134. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 404 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 526).
135. Id.
136. See also the Act of 1916 discussed in note 56; supra.
137. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 404.
138. Often, as in this case, the lower federal 'court makes its determination solely
on the recommendation of a magistrate.
139. Review of determinations of fact is, in itself, a muddled area of law. In
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme.Court determined that a federal
court could review the facts of each case to determine if the petitioner had rightly
been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But see Sumner v. Mata, discussed at
notes 153-60, infra, and accompanying text.
140. Friendly, supra; note 66 at 142.
141. See note 119, supra.
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detrimental effect on the efficiency of our judicial system. Because,
the procedural rules of the habeas corpus statute allow an unlimited
number of successive petitions "" and provide no time limitation on
filing,"' access to the district courts through habeas corpus has in-
creased the caseload astoundingly"' and extended indefinitely the
time before a final judgment is decreed."' Furthermore, since all
state remedies must be exhausted before habeas review will be'
granted,' a petitioner and the state may go through as many as ten,
judicial proceedings,"' not counting any retrials or en bane hearings,
before a final determination is made. This process ties up judges,
prosecutors, and other court personnel, diverting them from their
primary function of enforcing criminal law. The point may well be
reached where the delays. created lead to violations of the defen-
dant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial."8 Because of the
backlog in the court's dockets, an arrested defendant-especially
one too poor to post bail-has a wait, often in prison, of usually a
year before his case is even heard."' The infinite possibility of hav-
ing a judgment reversed also has a deleterious effect on both the
deterrent and rehabilitative functions of the criminal justice system
by interfering with the prisoner's "realization ...that he is justly
subject 'to sanction . . .(and] ...stands in need of rehabilitation.","
However, restricting habeas relief to the "arguably innocent" unless
there has not been a full and fair state hearing"' will not necessarily
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). See also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7
(1963).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). See also United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475
(1947).
144.. In 1953, Justice Jackson felt the courts were inundated by 541 petitions,
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 536. In 1979, 8,763 petitions were filed. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 71, at 61.
145. A prime example is the instant case where eighteen years have passed since
the trial and the case is still not final; an appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. See
also Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1970) (44 years).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
147. It is possible a defendant will have a trial, a state appeal, an appeal to the
Supreme Court, a petition for habeas corpus to the state district court, an appeal of
that determination to both the state and federal supreme courts, a petition to the
federal district court for habeas relief, and an appeal to the circuit, court and the
Supreme Court.
148. "In all criminal prosecutions,the accused shallenjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial ...." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
149. Friendly, supra note 66, at 148-49 & n.27. Also, a civil case usually has a two-
year wait to be heard on appeal. Because a criminal defendant has a right to a speedy
trial, criminal appeals are heard first.,
150. Bator, supra note 54, at 452.
151. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, discussed at note 78, supra.
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relieve this problem. Petitioners simply will cast their complaint in
procedural rather than substantive terms, thereby still requiring a
hearing to determine the adequacy of the state process."'
In the recent decision of Sumner v. Mata55 the Supreme Court
may have formulated a procedure to relieve both of these problems.
In Sumner, the Court applied Section D of the habeas corpus
statute'" more strictly than it has in the past by requiring the
lower federal courts to "include in [their opinions] granting the writ,
the reasoning which led it to conclude that any of the [specified] fac-
tors"'5 [negating the presumption of correctness of the state court
determination) were present, or the reasoning which led it to con-
clude that the state finding was 'not fairly supported by the
record.' "'" The true significance of the opinion, however, lies in the
fact that the majority did not distinguish between determinations of
fact and law; as the dissent points out, 7 the majority applies the
section to a mixed determination of law and fact'5 -an area where
most criminal procedural violations take place. If the courts enforce
this rule strictly, it could effectually reduce the amount of federal
review of state determinations"' while expressing confidence in the
152. See Duker, supra note 48, at 297.
153. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
155. Those factors are:
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing; (2) that the fact finding procedure employed by the State court was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the State court hearing; (4) that the State court lacked juris-
diction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court
proceeding; (5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in depriva-
tion of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the
State court proceeding; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and ade-
quate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was other-
wise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding; or (8) unless that
part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of
such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for here-
inafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a
whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record[.l
Id.
156. 440 U.S. at 551.
157. Id. at 556-58.
158. Sumner concerned the constitutionality of a pre-trial identification process.
159. It is arguable, though, that a decrease in number will not occur; petitioners
may continue to file and the amount of time spent reviewing the record would be as
much. if not more, than the amount of time it takes to hear a case on the merits.
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state judicial processes."'
The third concern, and possibly the most urgent, is the release
of unquestionably guilty defendants based on a constitutional viola-
tion. The original purpose for the formation of "government" was to
band people together to provide mutual protection from aggressors.
One of the principal goals of our own government, as set forth in the
preamble to the Constitution, is "to insure domestic Tranquility.'...
The law as set forth in the body of the Constitution and in state and
federal statutes should be viewed as rules, regulations, and
guarantees provided to aid in the continuous journey toward
ultimate goals; those goals must always be kept in sight. At least
one Supreme Court justice"'2 has recognized that "insuring domestic,
tranquility" is a top-priority goal; and,.the Supreme Court, in 1904,11
recognized that it should serve to aid in the interpretation of any
rights implied in the text..'" To live in peace and to be secure in his
person, house, papers, and effects is a right of American citizens im-
pliedly recognized by the fourth amendment,' 8 but which transcends
that amendment's restriction of governmental interference. Alter-
natively, the ninth amendment establishes that none of the enumer-
ated rights should be construed so as to deny or to disparage other
rights retained by the people. 6' Today, the courts need to broaden
their perspective, to reappraise the balance sheet, and to reconsider
the weight to be given a person's right-whether guaranteed within
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights or retained by the people-to a
peaceful and secure existence when balanced against an unques-
tionably guilty defendant's right to have a trial free from constitu-
tional violations. Another constitutional conflict arises, as mentioned
before,6 7 between a possibly innocent person's right to a speedy
trial and a guilty prisoner's right to review and possible reversal of
his conviction.
Although the only effectual remedy to a constitutional violation
160. This situation could result if, for example, the courts leave more state deter-
minations standing.
161. U.S. CONST., preamble. See Estelle v. Jurek, 101 S. Ct. 1724, 1727 (1981)-(Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
162. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Eatelle v. Jurek, 101 S. Ct. at 1727.
163. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1904).
164. 1d. at 22. See also HART AND WESCHSLER, supra note 133, at 446.
165. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
166. U.S. CONST., art. IX.
167. See text at note 148, 8upra.
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within the criminal justice system seems to be reversal of judg-
ment,'8 this remedy certainly is not constitutionally mandated. In
weighing the costs to society sustained by freeing the guilty against
the effectiveness of the remedy, the time may have come to provide
another, albeit less effective, remedy-such as civil or criminal sanc-
tions imposed upon the party guilty of the constitutional violation."9
Without altering the scope of the habeas statute, the Supreme
Court could implement a policy designed to keep the guilty in jail by
providing a broader harmless error rule. The concept of harmless
error is not new to our system of justice. "' Fahy v. Connecticut" '
and more explicitly, Chapman v. California" recognized that "there
may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a par-
ticular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, con-
sistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless .. . -"
However, Chapman placed the burden on the state to "prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained.""' This task is nearly impossible. The Court
could lessen this burden by requiring the petitioner to prove that
the error did contribute to the verdict; or, in the alternative, the
Court could apply a rule similar to that which California had prior to
the Chapman opinion, that is, forbidding reversal unless " 'the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.' '"" Granted, this change would often remove
168. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 557-59.
169. See id. at 577-79 (Stewart, J., concurring); Carter v. Jury Comm. of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 2,13
(1976).
170. The Exchequer Rule in England stated that prejudice presumptively attended
every trial error. This statement resulted in such overcrowding that litigation seemed
to survive until the parties expired. Faced with more retrials than new trials, the
English created the harmless error rule which prohibited reversal absent substantial
wrong. The American courts also adopted the Exchequer Rule and developed the same
backlog. The Rule also was abused in America; apparently many lawyers placed error
in the record as a hedge against losing the verdict (not unlike what seems to be hap-
pening with constitutional claims). Finally, in the early nineteenth century, America in-
troduced the harmless error rule in virtually every jurisdiction. See generally
Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
421, 422-23 (1980) (Mr. Goldberg's article,' however, criticizes the use of harmless error
as applied to constitutional claims).
17f. 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
172. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also Harrington v. California. 395 U.S. 250 (1969),
which gives a less restrictive interpretation to the harmless error rule.
173. 386 U.S. at 22.
174. Id. at 24.
175. Id. at 20.
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from a guilty petitioner the remedy of retrial leaving him with only
the right to file a civil claim.' But by requiring that the petitioner
show a substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court can emphasize
that the United States Government, in protecting the rights of all
its citizens, will no longer tolerate disrespect and disregard of
criminal laws. In so doing, the Court can promote judicial
efficiency, 1' rehabilitation of criminals,"8 and more effective law en-
forcement.' It can renew the confidence in our judicial system,"
and generally, provide for a more secure society. 8'
Even if the Court declines to promote such a policy by broaden-
ing the harmless error rule, it should reconsider its exclusion of
grand jury discrimination claims under the present rule. Justice
Stewart,"' in his concurrence in Rose v. Mitchell,"' advanced an ex-
cellent.argument as to why an otherwise valid conviction should not
be set aside on a claim of grand jury discrimination. A grand jury
determines whether a crime has been committed and if criminal pro-
ceedings should be instituted against someone."' Any possible pre-
judice suffered by a defendant indicted by an unconstitutionally im-
paneled grand jury is "speculative at best" ' and disappears after a
valid trial jury finds him guilty.'" The Court, on the one hand, has
recognized a fundamental right to serve on a grand jury and on the
other has not required that states use them."' It also does not re-
quire reversal of convictions where gross constitutional violations
took place at the grand jury hearing.'" In fact, the Court does not
require reversal for any violation that took place before trial when
that violation had no "impact on the trial itself.""' Although
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
177. See the discussion at notes 143-49, supra.
178. See Bator, supra note 54, at 452.
179. A defendant's realization that his guilt precludes any opportunity of his
avoiding his prison sentence would' perhaps discourage him from taking a chance.
180. See note 197, infra.
181. See text at notes 161-66, supra.
182. Joined by Justice Rehnquist.
183. 443 U.S. at 574-79.
184. Id. at 575.
185. Id. at 577.
186. Id. at 575.
187. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
188. 443 U.S. at 577 (Stewart, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1973); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1957) (violations of fifth
amendment). Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (hearsay evidence).
189. 443 U.S. at 576 (Stewart, J., concurring). See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258 (1973)h United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966); Stroble v. California, 343
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recognizing the compelling constitutional interest in eliminating all
forms of racial discrimination, Justice Stewart felt that such an in-
terest could be fully vindicated by other means;'"9 injunctive relief
requested by qualified black citizens wishing to assert their right to
serve on the grand jury, criminal sanctions against any person who
discriminates, and the pretrial relief for defendants. 91 Statutory civil
remedies are also available to the defendant.' 2 Justice Powell
answered the majority's contention that jury discrimination damaged
the integrity of the judicial system by pointing to the equal amount
of damage done to society's perception of the criminal justice
system by allowing valid convictions to be reversed on the basis of
claims having nothing to do with the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence.' 93 An argument advanced by the majority, which no concur-
ring justice answered, is that reversal does not make a defendant
immune from prosecution and is less drastic in grand jury cases
than in situations where other violations occur, because upon retrial
all evidence still can be used.9 ' However, the Court did not give
much import to the fact that in those cases where, for example, over
two years have passed, a retrial could be in theory only: Often
evidence is destroyed and witnesses are no longer available.' In
short, claims of grand jury discrimination should not be grounds for
setting aside otherwise valid criminal convictions.
The concern over releasing a guilty person into a society marked
by a high crime rate'" and a correspondingly reduced confidence in
its criminal justice system' is an important concern that deserves
U.S. 181, 197 (1952) ("[Illegal acts of state officials prior to trial are relevant only as
they. bear on petitioner's contention that he has been deprived of a fair trial.
190. 443 U.S. at 578-79.
191. Id. at 578.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
193. 443 U.S. at 586 n.8 (Powell, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 557-58.
195. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Cassell v.
Texas. 339 U.S. 282, 304 (Jackson, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra note 66, at 445.
196. It is estimated that for every ten crimes committed, only three or four are
reported. Over 5,000 crimes are reported annually per 100,000 persons. "ITlhe odds
that any one of us will be a crime victim in a year's time are better than one out of
twenty." Mikva, Victimless Justice, 71 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189, 190 (1980).
197. Eighty-five percent of our population feel that the courts deal too leniently
with criminals and that this leniency is second only to inflation and unemployment iii
causing the increasing crime rate; and 72 percent of our country no longer have a
great deal of confidence in our Supreme Court. See SOURCeBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS IN 1980, at 192-93, 196-97. This data was provided by the National Opinion
Research Center and made available through the Roper Public Opinion Research
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immediate attention. The concern, however, should receive, that at-
tention forthrightly and not through the back door of habeas corpus.
The idea of denying review to a guilty petitioner is of constitutional
magnitude;' and if such a policy is to be adopted, it should apply in
both appellate and habeas proceedings. In addition, restrictions of
habeas corpus jurisdiction related to claims of innocence are
misdirected on state deference grounds-if a state court is compe-
tent enough to review a guilty defendant's claim, then the same
state court should be equally competent to review claims of innocent
defendants as well. Also, restriction of habeas jurisdiction to claims
of innocence arguably would not serve to increase judicial
efficiency.'" Such a restriction; based on a claim which has never
been considered within the scope and purpose of the writ,00 would
also effectively deny a petitioner a review by. a federal forum.
Granted, the expanded scope of the writ of habeas corpus has made
it an unwieldy procedural instrument and has confounded at least
three of the major concerns in our judicial system today. Exclusion
of guilty prisoners from review, however, will do nothing to make
the writ more manageable and little to properly resolve any of the
aforementioned concerns. The time has come for Congress to restore
the writ with all its procedural requirements "I to its original jurisdic-
tional scopel22 and at the same time to provide a more suitable
forum for federal constitutional claims." 3 By eliminating this process
of review and appeal for most prisoners-guilty or in-
nocent-Congress would be reducing the caseload on the, courts'
dockets, thereby decreasing the amount of time between trial and
final judgment and decreasing the amount of review of state
supreme court determinations. By providing aid to the .Supreme
Court in their appellate review, Congress also would provide an ef-
fective federal forum for constitutional claims. If Congress or the
Supreme Court then decided to institute a stricter harmless error
rule, the determination would be forthright and would serve to put
the citizenry of the country on notice that in balancing the constitu-
Center. See also G. GALLUP,THE GALLUP POLL(Chicago: Field Enterprises, Inc., Dec. 2,
1979) at 3, 4.
198. See note 119, supra.
199. See the discussion at note 159 and text at note 152, supra.
200. See generally text at notes 23-46, supra.
201, See text at notes 142-43, supra.
202. See text at notes 36-44, supra.
203. A number of suggestions have been made for such a forum. Judge Friendly
suggests either an appropriate court of appeals or a newly-created court. See Friendly,
supra note 66, at 67.
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tional rights of Americans, the government has found the right to
domestic tranquility, and to a peaceful and secure existence, to out-
weigh the right to procedural guarantees that do not affect the fact-
finding process.
Michelle Ward LaBorde
LOUISIANA LIGNITE-A LUMBERMAN'S LAMENT:
Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison (La. 1981)
After extensive negotiations, a vendor sold several non-
contiguous tracts of land comprising 90,000 acres to the vendee, a
timber producer, subject to a reservation of all mineral rights. The
plaintiff corporation (Continental Group) succeeded the original
vendee; the vendor corporation dissolved and distributed its remain-
ing assets among the present defendants. Continental Group sought
a declaratory judgment, asserting that each servitude created by
the mineral reservation included only the right to explore for and
exploit oil, gas, and kindred minerals and did not include the right
to strip-mine solid minerals. The parties stipulated that the ser-
vitudes had expired as to all minerals on several non-contiguous
tracts because nothing had occurred on these tracts to interrupt the
ten-year prescription of non-use. The defendants asserted that
prescription on the servitudes governing the other tracts had been
interrupted by oil or gas production and that accordingly they. were
entitled to strip-mine the lignite coal on those lands. The plaintiff
then contended that the defendants' oil and gas operations were in-
sufficient to prevent accrual of liberative prescription as to solid
minerals which require a different method of extraction from the
earth. The Louisiana Supreme Court held, on rehearing, that the
original parties' negotiations evidenced their intent to include the
right to strip-mine lignite coal in the reservation, but that this right
had prescribed by non-use notwithstanding the production of oil and
gas. Continental Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
Generally, the use and extent of a contractual servitude must be
regulated exclusively by the written act creating it. When the terms
are clear and explicit, the servitude cannot be restricted, modified,
or limited.' Often, however, the contracts, especially those creating
1. See Delahoussaye v. Landry, 3 La. Ann. 549, 550 (1848).
1148
